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* * * * *

PROCEEDINGS
PROFESSOR CARLE: Hello everybody. Welcome to the afternoon
session. I am Susan Carle. I teach legal ethics here at the
Washington College of Law and am very pleased to be introducing
our very distinguished panel for the symposium entitled, The Evolving
Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
I understand that the morning panels, the second panel especially,
1
explored some of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the new SEC
2
3
proposed regulations that have been issued under Section 307. So,
we have decided as a panel to skip over some of that and to start to
discuss from several perspectives what this is actually going to mean
for lawyers who are representing corporate entities.
Each of the panelists will speak for about ten minutes, raising their
issues and concerns. I am going to let the panelists define the scope
of their topics as they take their turn to speak. Then we hope to have
plenty of time left over for interesting discussion and debate among
different perspectives on these issues.
What I will do now is introduce all of the panelists and then we will
jump right into it.
First of all, to my immediate right is Professor Jeffrey Bauman from
Georgetown University Law Center. His specialty is corporate law.
He joined Georgetown University Law Center in 1973 and before that
spent four years at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and five
years in private practice. He served on the Executive Council of the
Securities Law Committee of the Federal Bar Association, on the
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar
Association (“ABA”), and the Committee of Corporations,
Partnerships and other Business Organizations of the D.C. Bar
Association.
His writings include several law review articles
4
concerning 10b-5, and he also is the co-author of a casebook on
corporations.

1.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
2. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(establishing standards of conduct for attorneys who represent issuers before the
SEC).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7245).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002) (proscribing the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security).
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PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Which I hope you will all use.
PROFESSOR CARLE: In the best of the traditions of the bar,
Professor Bauman also serves in a number of public interest and
public service capacities, including on the Board of Directors of the
Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless.
To his immediate right is Arthur Burger, who is a Director at
Jackson & Campbell, P.C. where he chairs the firm’s Professional
Responsibility Practice Group and the firm’s Ethics Committee. He is
a member of the D.C. Bar Rules of Conduct Review Committee and
frequently lectures and teaches on ethics issues for the D.C. Bar. He
is an adjunct faculty member at George Washington University Law
School and co-teaches a course entitled, “Ethics in Adjudication and
Settlement.” Mr. Burger represents attorneys in law firms on matters
related to professional responsibility.
To his immediate right is Susan Hackett, who is the Senior VicePresident and General Counsel for the American Corporate Counsel
Association (“ACCA”). She lectures regularly before a wide variety of
legal audiences and is the author of numerous articles on
professional and managerial topics.
She serves on the Board of Directors of Equal Justice Works and
was a former member of the Board of the Minority Corporate
Counsel Association. Her public service work includes serving as
liaison to a number of ABA presidential commissions, on issues such
as multi-jurisdictional practice, alternatives to the billable hour, and,
on something many students in this room may be concerned with,
loan repayment assistance programs. She also serves on the ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility.
To her immediate right is Sheldon Krantz, who is a partner at the
law firm of Piper Rudnick LLP. His practice emphasizes preventative
and litigation services in corporate and white collar criminal matters.
His particular areas of focus include environmental law, healthcare,
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), exports, Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), legal ethics, and
legal malpractice.
He is a former Chair of the Criminal Justice Center of the ABA and
has had extensive experience in white collar crime prevention and
investigation. He also, early in his career, was a prosecutor for the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice
Department. He was a law professor at Boston University School of
Law—where I hear from my husband that he was an excellent
professor—and then was Dean of the University of San Diego law
school.
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I have the privilege of serving with Mr. Krantz on the D.C. Legal
Ethics Committee and can say that he is a very deft and diplomatic
committee member who has negotiated us through a number of
difficult ethics issues.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: I guess as the existing academic as
compared to a former academic, I get to start.
Actually it has been your privilege, such as it is, to have heard from
a number of fugitives from the real world, of whom I am the last to
speak today. You have heard from Professor Karmel, Professor
Painter, Professor Guttman, Judge Sporkin—although Judge Sporkin
has retreated back to the real world. Sheldon is now back in the real
world also.
This is a warm-up—this discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley. Another way
of thinking about Sarbanes-Oxley is to think of it as the “Continuing
Legal Education Relief Act of 2002.” I can promise you that there
will be a large number of Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”)
programs with people—large numbers of people paying huge
amounts of money—to hear people like us who are very good at
asking questions but end up with no answers.
MS. HACKETT: I’ll be taking all those registrations.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: There you go. This is a Godsend. I do
not have to get business because I am only an academic, but the
people out in the practicing bar do. In case you think that I am
jesting, I am old enough to remember when, in 1966-67, Judge
5
McLean, Southern District of New York, decided the BarChris case.
One thousand lawyers paid a huge amount of money to find out how
6
to avoid liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. We all knew
that we, the Wall Street bar, were not going to be nailed for any kind
of wrongdoing. It was “them”—those people who turned out
opinions with mimeograph machines who were going to get nailed.
Judge McLean instead said, “No, it’s the lawyers who are very much at
7
fault for not doing sufficient due diligence.”
5. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(concluding that defendants’ gross overstatements of sales, profits, and customer
orders; understatements of liabilities; and the failure to disclose officer loans,
customer delinquencies, and application of proceeds constituted material matters on
which the court could base liability).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (detailing the civil liabilities when a registrant
omits a material fact from a securities registration statement or if the registration
statement contains an untrue statement about a material fact).
7. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 692 (finding that an attorney of the law firm, which
counseled BarChris Construction Corporation in matters concerning the registration
of securities, “was obliged to make a reasonable investigation” but he failed to satisfy
that obligation because “there [were] too many instances in which [he] failed to
make an inquiry which he could easily have made . . . .”).
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8

When Texas Gulf Sulphur was decided, a thousand people showed
up at a Practicing Law Institute forum. I have no doubt that
Sarbanes-Oxley will generate just this kind of response.
I want to start with my own background. As Susan said, I spent four
years at the SEC, five years in private practice at Arnold & Porter, and
I have been teaching since what my children refer to as the “pre-Civil
War days,” for thirty years.
I also want to go back to some of what Chuck Davidow talked about
in the first panel this morning. I think all of us practicing corporate
and securities law bring with us our own set of cultural biases and
assumptions.
I left the Commission in 1968. I was a relatively young lawyer. I
had spent four years at a very exciting time in the Commission’s
career, right after the legislation, the special study, it was very much a
golden age. It is not just that as I have gotten older that things look
better than they ever really were. It really was a great moment in the
Commission’s history.
I believed very firmly in the Commission’s mission to act in the
public interest and for the protection of investors, the mantra that
runs throughout the securities laws.
When I went to Arnold & Porter, my mentor, the senior partner for
whom I did most of my work, was Milt Freeman, who was also the
author of Rule 10b-5 when he was at the Commission. Milt told me
early in my stay that it had taken him nearly two years before he
stopped referring to the SEC as, “we.” I think that a number of us,
and it is probably still true, who worked at the Commission are
fiercely loyal to the Commission and very much buy into many of the
values that the Commission has over the years stood for—the
protection of the investors, whatever that may mean.
It has not necessarily interfered with being a zealous advocate, but
it certainly affects the way we have thought about the practice law. It
does not make us better or worse, but I think it does make us
somewhat different from people who have never had the “inside the
building” experience.
I know that it is easy to focus on the gatekeeper role and either
defend it or criticize it. But I think it was implicit in what we did, and
I think it is still true that, if you work on disclosure documents, as
distinct from giving opinions as to whether securities need to be
registered, if you work on disclosure documents you are very much
8. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 842 (2d Cir. 1968)
(determining that several individuals, including one of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s
attorneys, participated in insider trading).
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determining or advising on the materiality of disclosure. You are
saying, “Yes, this has to be disclosed; no, this doesn’t.” You do it from
the perspective of having as full disclosure as possible.
I have not read the Enron 10K, but when I listened to Chuck this
morning describe it, I am prepared to believe it. There is Supreme
9
Court law in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite that talks about materiality as
not simply getting the information out there, but getting it in a
10
readable, meaningful way. You can not put something on page 30,
something else on page 50, and something else on page 199, and say,
“I disclosed it all.” It has to be more than that. I think that we as
lawyers believe that, and, coming from the culture I came from, that
was the way I acted.
Putting this in Sarbanes-Oxley terms, I am struck by what it means
for the lawyers out in the trenches. I am not talking about, “Oh my
God, I’ve discovered the greatest scandal in the world. Do I go to the
board of directors?” I do not think that is going to happen very often.
I think that’s going to be the very rare case. Rather, I think Sarbanes11
12
Oxley is important, much as BarChris and Texas Gulf and some
13
other cases—Student Marketing, that was another 1000 person CLE
program—are important as wake-up calls, as reminders to the bar
that we have to take what we are doing seriously.
I am struck by how difficult the questions are and how very much
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves open—and I’ll be interested in what you all
have to say—what seem to me very much the kind of warp and woof
of daily practice.
As a young lawyer working on a registration statement, I would—
well, take an insurance company. I would spend several days
immersed in the State Insurance Commission reports, and I would
learn about the life insurance business, whatever it was. I would go
and I would spend time, however much time I needed, with top
company officials getting all the data I needed to draft the
registration. I would ask questions, and they would explain. I would
say, “You know, I think we have to disclose that.” The president, the
9. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
10. See id. at 385 (stating that courts tend to find materiality when the
shareholder demonstrates that the proxy solicitation, rather than a
misrepresentation in the solicitation materials, is responsible for the corporation
obtaining the votes required to authorize an action).
11. Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 643.
12. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833.
13. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342,
352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that buyers of newly issued securities had an
implied right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
against the securities issuer and its accounting firm, as well as outside counsel).
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CEO, would put his arm around me, and he would say, “Jeff, you’re
really a very smart, young lawyer.” Emphasis on the young. And he
says, “Frankly I’ve been in this business for thirty years, you don’t
understand. You really don’t. It isn’t material. If you knew it better,
you would see that. We’ve thought about that.”
He was right, I did not understand. Unless I had been doing
insurance law all of my life, I might never have understood. But if
you go from insurance, to cattle feeding, to oil and gas, you do not
understand anything. You understand just enough to get the
registration statement done, and you move on.
If I had been a young lawyer and I really was suspicious or
concerned—because I had been talked out of the disclosure, because
I had been told by someone that I don’t understand, by someone
who clearly does—am I now obligated to go up the ladder, starting
with the senior partner in my firm, and then the partner has to make
the decision to go to the general counsel of the client, and so on?
If I don’t do that, am I now subject to—. Am I now subject to
14
liability under 307?
Am I 307’ed or 102(e)’ed or whatever the
phrase is going to turn out to be? I don’t know what the answer to
that is.
There are a lot more questions than there are answers. I think all
of us sitting here could talk at great length about all of the issues that
were talked about in the first two panels, whether it is the desirability
of federalization, federalizing the state ethics, making it mandatory,
or you name it. We could all talk about it.
I asked the question in the first session, “if Sarbanes-Oxley, section
307 had been on the books, would Enron have come out any
differently?” Without knowing what Vinson & Elkins knew, or said, or
was asked to do, my instinct is no. It would not have changed
anything at all.
I think the virtue of Sarbanes-Oxley, as has been the case from time
to time, is to ask the question, “Where were the lawyers?” It serves a
useful function. Whether it ought to go as far as it goes or how far it
will go, I leave to my fellow panelists.
PROFESSOR CARLE: Thank you.
MR. BURGER: Thanks, Professor, for leaving it up to us.
PROFESSOR CARLE: I think we will just go right down the line.
MR. BURGER: Good afternoon. I come at this having a sort of
natural sympathy for the lawyer who is on the ground as the Professor
14. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
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said, having represented lawyers, and being one, and having faced
many dilemmas. I am pretty comfortable with the traditional
paradigm that the lawyer has full loyalty and confidence to the client,
and that in return for that, the client freely has a flow of information
to the lawyer. It is kind of a cozy relationship, and it works because
the involvement of the lawyer will tend to improve the ultimate
product.
15
That is the notion of the attorney-client privilege. It is that the
free flow of information is considered beneficial. Yes, the person who
holds the privilege would have some pretty good tales to tell as would
a priest or a doctor or anybody else who has a privilege. But there is
an ultimate benefit to it.
So, I am brought a bit kicking and screaming into this notion that
the SEC has promulgated, but I am a little bit more optimistic that
this may make sense. I have as a sort of an axiom, in order to keep
my sanity, the mantra that I always have in addressing an ethical
dilemma—there always has to be some place on the cat walk that you
are allowed to place your foot. There has got to be someplace.
Because the alternative is, obviously, a big fall.
There always has to be some right answer for a lawyer. For me, and
this is as a member of the D.C. Bar Rules of Professional Conduct
Review Committee where the rules get revised, is, whatever rule there
should be for a lawyer, at least make it clear. At least point to where
that spot is on the catwalk and then I know where to place my foot.
Of course, that whole notion of there being a place on the catwalk
gets awfully narrow when we are talking about a situation in which
the lawyer as advocate instantly has to become watchdog based upon
some ephemeral series of events.
The statute was quite brief in terms of what these rules ought to
16
encompass.
They really took these and filled in an awful lot of
15. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”).
16. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. at 749-50 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7245) (stating that an attorney must “report evidence of a material breach of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the
company” and “if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence . . . requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of
the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to
the board of directors”).
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questions. I think there are some answers to the questions, and there
are very specific circumstances which mandate an outside lawyer to
17
withdraw and circumstances with an in-house counsel as not having
18
to resign for instance. But the length that you can fall from this
catwalk has really gotten pretty steep. I do not know if anybody in the
19
earlier panels that Section 205.6 says that a violation by the lawyer of
this section is subject to the same penalties and remedies as a
20
violation of the Act. So, that is a big difference for lawyers who have,
up to this point, assumed that there was some degree of immunity for
aiding and abetting situations.
The reason why I say it may make sense is two things. One, an SEC
practice, more than other types of attorney representation, does
involve a very high degree of the attorney actually participating in the
product. The lawyer is right in there, in the trench with the client,
inherently in an SEC-type practice. Two, I have to say that the SEC
staff obviously put a great deal of work and a great deal of thought
into pretty specific rules. To me, one of the most interesting
provisions here is that it gives—this is very interesting in terms of the
dynamic between lawyer and client. A client can fire a lawyer at any
21
time for any reason or for no reason. That will never change. The
client can fire the lawyer. But, the lawyer is permitted, if the lawyer
thinks that they were fired for complying with these provisions, to
22
take that fact to the Commission. That is a real power shift. The
17. See Implementation of the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71689 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205) (requiring the “noisy withdrawal” of an outside attorney who believes that a
material violation is occurring or is going to occur and who finds the issuer’s
response inappropriate, after reporting the breach to the issuer).
18. See id. at 71674 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3) (requiring an issuer’s inhouse attorney who believes that a material violation is ongoing or is about to occur
and will cause substantial injury, to disaffirm any work product associated with the
violation but is not required to withdraw).
19. See id. at 71696 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (stating that an attorney
practicing before the SEC, while representing an issuer, is subject to the same
penalties of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-u (2000) (“The Commission
may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, to any person the
privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission in any way, if that person
is found by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter-(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; (2) to be lacking in
character or integrity, or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct; or (3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation
of, any provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations issued
thereunder”).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (2002) (stating a lawyer
shall not represent a client when the lawyer is discharged); id. R. 1.16 cmt. 4
(explaining that a client has the right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or
without cause).
22. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
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lawyer is in a position, a dangerous position, to fight back in a pretty
big way.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: There is a material omission in the
statement.
MR. BURGER: It is a material—and, of course, the real crux of the
issue will be that the lawyer will need to make the call, is there a
material violation? If yes, there is a place on the catwalk. But, if the
lawyer says, “No, there is not a material violation,” then there is a long
way to fall. If the lawyer says, “Yes, there is a material violation,” there
is also a long way to fall, but there is still a place on the catwalk.
MS. HACKETT: I am going to address the, “who is the client
issue,” since that is an issue that is very near and dear to my
membership at the American Corporate Counsel Association.
Before I do, I wanted to first of all make my caveat that we are still
formulating our opinion at ACCA. We plan to be filing comments on
this issue with the Commission, so what I am talking about today may
or may not end up actually representing the opinion of the
association on this. We’re still working on it.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: It may not even be your opinion.
MS. HACKETT: Exactly. The other thing that I would note before
I begin these comments is that, especially in listening to the
discussion today and in thinking about this issue for the last several
weeks and even months, I have gone back to look at the fundamental
purpose of lawyer regulation and professional responsibility. I think
it is important as we hold these dialogues and have these discussions
to recognize that there is a difference between professional
responsibility and lawyer regulation. There are some professional
rules in the code that are about professional responsibility: 1.1—
23
24
competence; 1.6—attorney-client privilege; 1.7—conflict of interest
25
questions. But when it comes right down to it, the vast bulk of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility is not really about
professional responsibility, it is about lawyer regulation of the bar by
26
ourselves.
Fed. Reg. at 71706 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposing that an attorney
who reasonably believes that a corporate client fired him for reporting a material
violation, may notify the SEC of this belief).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (stating that a lawyer must provide
competent representation).
24. Id. R. 1.6 (stating the general rule that a lawyer shall not reveal any
information relating to the representation of a client).
25. Id. R. 1.7 (stating that a lawyer may not represent a client if that
representation would be in conflict with the representation of another client except
in a few explicitly stated circumstances).
26. See, e.g., id. R. 8.3 (stating that lawyers have a duty to regulate other lawyers).

PANEL 3.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:05 PM

PANEL 3

665

I think that it is important as we look at these questions to keep in
mind, what is professional responsibility and what is lawyer
regulation? Or put another way, within my membership, what is
about the lawyers and what is about the clients?
Within the American Corporate Council Association, this is a very
regular debate. We constantly remind ourselves as we are working on
issues like this that we need to remember that this is not about novel
contemplation for lawyers and their self-regulatory needs. This is also
about the representation of clients and what they expect, demand,
and have a right to expect from their lawyers.
I think the other thing I would note before we begin is something
that came up a little bit earlier. There is an assumption out here that
these rules are really applying to people who are within the corporate
structure or in law firms representing clients and working on
securities matters. I think that we do not know yet how far these rules
will go, but I would be willing to bet you dollars to donuts that what is
going to happen is that a lot more lawyers are going to be subject to
these rules than you may be believing if you are thinking this is really
about people who are working on 10Ks.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: I agree with that. If you are an anti-trust
lawyer, there are securities implications to the anti-trust work you are
doing even if you are not working on the disclosure documents.
MS. HACKETT: Remember, these are going to go beyond
securities laws. The SEC is mandating an “up the ladder” reporting
obligation if an attorney reasonably believes that a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary or similar violation has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. Now that is a heck of a
lot more than securities law for which the SEC is going to be
requiring mandatory reporting. Breach of fiduciary duty could be
about environmental law. I think you should keep in mind that this is
not just about securities law or people who work on securities law.
This is potentially far more reaching than that.
Having said that, I had wanted to talk a little bit about who is the
client in order to bring to you some of the practical perspectives that
I think we are hearing from our members and that we have been
polling and doing some survey work on, so that you might hear what
some of the buzz on the street actually is within the corporate
community, the corporate legal community, on this issue.
First of all, everyone that we are talking to—when I am talking
about this, I am generally talking about general counsel. I know that
there are many other people involved in the legal business of inhouse counseling beyond the general counsel. But, for all intents
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and purposes, since the general counsel is the person who sets the
tone within the organization’s legal department and since it is that
person who will determine the “up the ladder” crawl, I am generally
focusing on what our general counsel are saying.
What’s the buzz on the street? Everyone admits that we need to do
something post-Enron to restore public trust in corporations and,
more particularly, public trust in corporate financial results. The
problem lies in understanding what solutions will actually address the
concerns that Enron raises about the role of lawyers. In truth, it
appears that the vast majority of post-Enron proposals are really
designed to give more comfort to the public, but will do little
practically to impact clients and may have a perversely deleterious
effect on the likelihood that lawyers will be able to prevent such
debacles in the future.
This is a common refrain that we are hearing right now within the
corporate community. It is not that they are not willing to embrace
reforms or that they do not believe that reforms are needed. But
working around the Rules of Professional Responsibility or going
through this kind of rulemaking process at the SEC is missing the
point. It is not going to create an environment where Enrons will be
prevented in the future.
If you talk to most sophisticated in-house general counsel, they will
tell you that the SEC proposals, as they understand them at this stage,
are not really very threatening in a practical manner. Many of them
already live in highly regulated worlds and the concept of reporting
up the ladder and even reporting up and out of the corporation are
well-established and will not change the way they work with their
management or staff.
The concerns that we are raising at ACCA tend to be concerns that
we have as a bar association and on behalf of our members because
we are involved in longer term questions about what is happening
with the rules and where that will lead us in ten years than our
members may be focused on right now.
Most folks within the in-house community that we are talking to do
not feel overly threatened by what is being proposed because they do
not think it is going to affect them. Indeed, most general counsel at
larger companies are taking their cue from their management and
are seeking to embrace changes in an effort to re-instill confidence in
corporate America and live up to higher standards of responsible
corporate citizenship.
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That does not mean that they are thrilled by Sarbanes-Oxley or the
27
SEC’s proposed regulations. But, because Enron-like debacles are
not widespread problems, in spite of the amount of coverage they
receive and the size of these recent failures, I think that most assume
that it is unlikely that they will ever have to grapple with a situation
that would give rise to the reporting requirements of the SarbanesOxley Act.
In a practical world, I do not know of a single general counsel who
honestly believes that they would report up the ladder of their
management, and even beyond their management to the board, and
that any board in the Western world at this point would say to them,
“We choose not to take your advice, we’d rather have an SEC
investigation triggered.” It’s just never going to happen. So, while
ACCA as an organization is likely to protest the diminution of the
attorney-client privilege presented by the rules in their reporting out
requirements, we are certainly not hearing our members telling us
that this is a huge issue that they believe is really going to impact the
way they practice. It will only happen in the organization where the
general counsel is absent and has not really focused on this issue or
where you are perhaps in a small organization that is very closely held
and that does not really understand the realities of the environment.
What is wrong with these proposed rules then from the perspective
of the bar? Even if you do not ever plan to report under the rules,
there are a few issues that we believe in-house counsel are concerned
about and that certainly as an organization we are taking a stand on.
These are the issues that concern the bar because they make policy
changes that go beyond, way beyond, the desire to change the
practice of lawyers working in a few errant companies, and indeed
change the design of our ethics rules.
John Villa, who we work with quite regularly and who practices at
Williams & Connolly, puts it in a very succinct manner. He says that
what these rules do is threaten to change us from focusing on
prohibiting lawyers from getting involved in or facilitating client
misconduct to creating rules that focus on making lawyers prohibit
clients from committing misconduct.
There is a significant
difference. The model rules, traditionally, have been about making
28
sure lawyers do not do illegal things. Instead, these are changes that
would make model rules for lawyers to make them responsible for
prohibiting their clients from engaging in illegal conduct—a
27. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670, 71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
28. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.
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policeman’s role.
These proposals, therefore, offer a rather novel approach to the
age-old in-house question of, who is the client? By making a lawyer a
policeman, in order to get to that role, you have to do some pretty
careful acrobatics. The technical answer to the question of who is the
client is the entity. Most in-house counsel know that the practical
reality is that the entity only works on a day-to-day basis through the
flesh and blood actions of management and the board. They treat
the management of the company as the day-to-day client as long as
the management stays within the law. If the management acts
inappropriately and will not change course, the lawyer reminds the
managers in question that the client is actually the company and they
29
start the climb up the 1.13 ladder of authority seeking redress.
If management is intransigent, the lawyer goes over their head to
the board. If the board does not take responsible action, then the inhouse lawyer has to consult the rules in his or her state to understand
what the options and mandates are. We talked a little bit earlier
about the 1.6 issues that are currently in play between the ABA, which
has a model rule in conflict with what forty-one states have as their
30
31
model rule for 1.6, or for their rule 1.16.
The SEC’s regulations, however, say that the entity’s best interests
require the lawyer to report to the SEC, because management and
the board cannot represent the client’s interest if they are acting
32
illegally.
That argument may be intellectually appealing, but it suffers from
a few pesky faults. First, if the board and the management are no
longer a valid representative of the client, who exactly is the lawyer
29. See id. R. 1.13(b)(3) (stating that if a lawyer knows that a person associated
with the client organization has or is likely to violate a law, which will likely result in a
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer has a duty to refer the matter
to a higher authority, including the highest authority in the organization).
30. Compare id. R. 1.6 (stating a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, but permitting
lawyers to reveal confidential information to protect the public’s safety or to establish
a defense in a suit against the lawyer), with e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (2002) (stating that it is mandatory for a lawyer to reveal confidential information
if the lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent his or her client from
committing a crime that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or bodily
harm).
31. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (detailing a lawyer’s duty
concerning declining or terminating representation of a client), with e.g., D.C.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw
from representation in certain situations, but not including the situation in which
the lawyer believes that the client’s objective is repugnant or imprudent).
32. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71690-91 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3) (stating that reporting the
alleged material violation to the SEC is for the purpose of protecting the issuer’s
interest).
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reporting to and representing? That is actually a pretty difficult
question to answer if you are the lawyer who is sitting in the shoes of
the person who has now gone up the ladder and found an
unresponsive management and an unresponsive board.
It certainly is not the SEC that you are representing, even though
these rules of conduct create a very difficult conflict of interest for
most lawyers who are now charged with either reporting to the SEC
or continuing to maintain what they had traditionally thought were
their client’s interests. In an era when stockholders can number in
the millions, is it reasonable to assume that the stockholders are the
client so that the lawyer has the representation interest in the
stockholders interest and should seek to avoid any action which
might cause the company’s stock to tumble? If the stockholder is the
client and the management and the board are no longer the client,
what will we be asking lawyers technically to do, protect the stock
price? That is certainly a perverse answer that we do not want lawyers
to be involved in. That is not at all what the goal of any of this
legislation was supposed to be.
It seems indeed that the only answer is that the client ends up
being the public interest. Now we have a situation, if you work this to
its logical conclusion where we have really put the legal profession
and our assumptions of what the attorney-client privilege and
professional responsibility to the client are, we now have lawyers who
do not represent the clients that they are retained by, but who
represent the public. That is the definition of a prosecutor or a
policeman—not the definition of a corporate lawyer.
I think that is where we are starting to run into some of the
difficulties in figuring out how it is—the “who is the client” question.
The way the SEC has answered it is going to play out in the corporate
role.
By deputizing lawyers who are employed or retained by corporate
clients to act as remedial policemen, what we are doing is
diminishing the client’s trust in the lawyer and his role. Rather, we
should be looking for ways to increase the influence of lawyers as
compliance counselors who specialize in preventive loss skills.
Instead of deputizing in-house counsel as legal police to wipe out
crime where it exists, the SEC’s proposals could have the perverse
effect of marginalizing the role of lawyers who could prevent crimes
from arising.
What would likely happen is that, in order to practice preventive
law, you have to be a welcome and respected participant in creating
the corporate culture. You must be invited to meetings. You need to
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be rewarded for your leadership with positions on strategic teams
where company policies and decisions are being made. There is no
way a lawyer can force herself into client activities where she is not
welcomed or she is not trusted and expect to hear anything
important. How much less effective and included will those counsel
playing the potential role of deputy on-the-spot for the SEC be in
performing their functions preventatively?
It is important to note that in this context “trusted” is not
synonymous with “complicit.” Trusted in-house counsel are advisors
who have the confidence and respect of their management, which
includes standing up to management where actions under discussion
do not measure up.
Indeed, our surveys of CEOs that ask what roles they wish their inhouse counsel to play tell us that there was only one role that was
more important to the CEO for the in-house counsel to play than
33
that of ethics advisor and that was as legal educator. The roles that
lost out on those surveys were roles that included acting as a personal
consultant to the CEO or representing other members of
34
management on specific issues. Clients want their in-house lawyers
to prevent legal problems from arising. That is why they hire them to
be full-time employees, rather than retaining them as outside counsel
only after a legal mess hits the fan.
When I came to work at ACCA, I learned what it is that makes the
thousands of in-house counsel unique from their outside
counterparts. It is their primary interest in keeping the client’s milk
in the glass and not cleaning it up or reporting it after it has been
spilled. Preventive loss practices are premised on the confidence of
the client in the lawyer as an effective and trusted part of the
corporate team. Post-Enron, this kind of preventive focus and service
will be twice as desirable for the public and far more desirable than
the too late service of a lawyer who reports wrongdoing already done.
ACCA’s attention is going to be focused on creating and
disseminating compliance-based resources for corporate lawyers to
help them target the needs and preventive concerns of their clients.
35
We are developing a full line of CLE initiatives, and also a variety of
33. See Special Report: The View from the Top: CEOs Give Their In-house Counsel an
“Excellent” Report Card, ACCA DOCKET, May 2001 (listing the top eleven roles of inhouse counsel given by corporate Chief Executive Officers), http://www.acca.com/
Surveys/CEO/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
34. See id.
35. See Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n Website, CLE Online-Long Distance Learning
(listing a plethora of online programs aimed at aiding and assisting in-house
counsel), at http://www.acca.com/education/cle.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
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collected best practices, Website resources, and what we call “bully
pulpit” and mentoring outreach that will help lawyers help clients
prevent future Enrons.
We think it is misguided to focus so much attention on changing
the Model Rules of lawyer conduct when we could be offering the
means to achieve realistic and workable solutions that foreclose
ethical lapses in modern corporate cultures. When we comment to
the SEC on these issues, we plan to remind the SEC that they are
making some very important choices when they publish these rules.
We believe it is unwise to change the rules of legal ethics without an
established connection between those changes and the
corresponding behaviors that are of concern. Absent such evidence
of a corresponding behavior change, we believe it is far wiser to
spend our time focused on how to prevent future Enrons from
arising.
Lawyers are and should remain vital parts of the corporate team
who can function to prevent corporate criminal activity by virtue of
their role as trusted advisors. No one calls a policeman until after the
crime is committed.
MR. KRANTZ: My role here today is going to be a little bit
different. I am a white collar criminal defense lawyer, and I will say at
the outset that I am an extremist on the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege. Let me tell you why by using an example, a personal
example.
Let’s say hypothetically that Dean Andy Pike is under criminal
investigation for a Ponzi scheme. He comes to my office. My view as
a criminal defense lawyer is that I need a client to tell me everything
that he can about his situation so I can figure out how to best
represent him. If I tell my client, Dean Pike, “Listen you can confide
in me, tell me everything so I can represent you effectively,” and he
does, and then I also serve as a surrogate of the government to turn
over miscreants, you can see the impact that would have on Dean
Pike.
But the other illustration is, let’s say I’m more forthcoming as a
lawyer, and I say to my client, “Listen, I want you to tell me everything
there is that I need to know to represent you, but on the other hand I
may confide in the government in terms of what you tell me.” What is
he going to do?
Now it seems to me—and I will get to the point of how this plays
out in a corporate context—it frames the issue of why the attorneyclient privilege is so important. I would say at the outset that I agree
with other members of the panel—if you take a look at Sarbanes-
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36

Oxley or the proposed SEC rules, for the most part, they do not
raise the fear that some of us who really care about the attorney-client
privilege would have up to this point. But I want to look down the
road a few years. Corporations are not the favorites of either
members of Congress or even the American public. It is easy to hate
corporations and, by the way, it is easy to hate lawyers.
On that basis, and we have certainly seen evidence of this in the
area of street crime over the period of the 1990s, once Congress gets
going, they will keep going. You can begin to anticipate what
additional requirements may be imposed upon lawyers and on
corporations just as a political matter. So, I am less concerned about
today. I am very concerned about where we are going to be going
tomorrow.
I want to give you one illustration of what is going on right now
that is a precursor, in my view, of the problem. There is something
37
called the “Holder Memorandum.”
Eric Holder was the former
Deputy Attorney General of the United States. During the Clinton
Administration, the Department of Justice issued the Holder
Memorandum, which provided guidelines to federal prosecutors on
38
situations when you prosecute companies or when you do not. This
is a very important set of guidelines for federal prosecutors.
There is a provision in the Holder Memorandum that says the
following: when someone comes in on behalf of a company and
attempts to convince you that you should not prosecute the company,
or comes in to talk to you in plea negotiations, it may be appropriate
for you to require waiver of attorney-client privilege as a condition of
39
having those discussions.
I want to tell you from personal experience, including an
experience that has been going on the last four months and even was
existing this morning before I came here, that I am in the midst of
talking to a U.S. Attorney’s office to try to convince that office that
my client is not guilty of any crime and they ought to decline
prosecution. The government’s response to me has been that the
way you do so is you waive attorney-client privilege and you give us
36. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71670 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
37. See Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney General, to All Component
Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (discussing the issue of bringing
criminal charges against corporations), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
policy/chargingcorps.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
38. See id. (delineating twelve principles to be referenced when determining
whether to prosecute corporations).
39. See id. (“[T]he prosecutor may request that the corporation waive the
attorney-client and work product privileges”).
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every document, the results of your internal corporate investigation.
Then we will decide whether or not it is appropriate either to decline
prosecution or to come up with a minor sentence that will not, in
40
effect, bankrupt your company.
This is not kind of an isolated situation. As I talk to members of
the white collar criminal defense bar around the country, there is a
common theme in U.S. Attorney’s offices that we need to get waivers
of attorney-client privilege because these lawyers are hiding
something, the companies are hiding something, and frankly, it is a
41
very easy way to investigate a crime.
Let me just tell you very quickly what the implications are of this
besides the impact on the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege. It
really picks up on something Susan said, which is, if the role of
responsible companies today is to try to get to the bottom of
problems when they hear allegations, either through a hotline or
through a subpoena, that there is a problem—a responsible company
wants to get to the bottom of it. When they retain outside counsel,
the direction to outside counsel is, get to the bottom of it, so we can
make informed decisions about what we have to do internally,
whether we have to provide information to the government.
The impact of requiring waivers of attorney-client privilege or
extending out the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley or SEC rules will
be this, very simply. Again, if I go into a company saying, “I’ve been
retained to engage in this internal investigation, and by the way, I
either tell you or you find out from some other source, that what you
provide to me in the form of documents and statements will be
turned over or potentially could be turned over because the
government is going to require it,” the impact of that is that witnesses
inside a company are not going to level with us when we are doing
our internal investigation. People stop taking notes. They don’t
write things down. They destroy documents, which makes it
impossible for a company to demand accountability from its
personnel and ultimately makes it difficult for companies to engage
in self-policing.
Because at the end of the day, if corporations are going to behave,
it is largely because of responsible management and lawyers who give
them the kind of advice other people on the panel were talking
about. If we are denied access to the truth because of rules that are
developed by the government, which in effect discourage honesty in
40. See id.
41. See id. Note that the Holder memo was widely distributed to “All Component
Heads and United States Attorneys.” Id.
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the process of investigation, we are in serious difficulty.
As I said, I am less worried about today. I am very worried about
where we are going and its impact. I would say, as a final matter, I
can understand the attitude that lawyers who participate in criminal
conduct in effect and then get to hide behind the shield of the
attorney-client privilege is a troublesome factor. I think that in
whatever system you devise there are going to be lawyers who
misbehave.
But I want to tell you also that the federal government, in my
experience is not afraid to prosecute lawyers who engage in
misconduct and for the most part, there will be ways to deal with
those problems. With that in mind, I think, Ms. Chair, we can open
the thing up for questions.
PROFESSOR CARLE: Thank you all very much. I think that was a
wonderful introduction to the many issues we can talk about. As I
suspected, I think that there is a lot of similarity, especially as we got
closer to the end of the table here, of situated perspectives of people
who represent either in-house or act as outside counsel to corporate
entities.
I want to sort of get things started by playing devil’s advocate in a
way—thinking about it from the other side. My situated practice
perspective before becoming a law professor was as a plaintiff’s lawyer
and a union side labor lawyer. I have been on the other side of this
question about attorney-client privilege and what kinds of facts can be
withheld in an investigation situation by cloaking them in attorneyclient privilege or by bringing in counsel to investigate wrong-doing.
My question is, what do you all think about the possibility that
there is something seriously wrong with the legal culture surrounding
legal compliance counseling by corporate lawyers in the sense that—
and I have certainly seen this with management-side labor lawyers—
instead of counseling compliance with the spirit of federal regulation,
the culture has become one where the counseling is to go as far as
you can to the line? To disclose as little as possible, to find a way to
massage the situation or massage the facts in a very aggressive kind of
anti-regulation perspective.
The SEC is feeling frustration about this. Because there is not a
culture of compliance, they feel that they need to figure out some
way to mandate the culture of compliance, and its best targets are the
lawyers who, of everybody representing the organization, should be
the ones who are most concerned about preserving the spirit of the
statute.
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I think this goes back to Professor Bauman’s earlier discussions
about a culture that existed, at least among lawyers who had formerly
worked for the SEC, of really caring about preserving the spirit and
the intent of the statutory structure. Is that gone? Is that really what
the problem is here? I will just open it up for everybody.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: I guess I wonder, particularly listening to
Sheldon, whether your question lumps together litigation and
transactional work. I understand that ultimately transactional work
can wind up in litigation. As my first boss, Manny Cohen, who was
then the Chairman of the SEC, used to begin his talks by saying, “Yes,
securities laws are criminal statutes,” and indeed they are. A willful
violation is that. But, for the most part, clients do not come to
transactional lawyers doing the deal the way they come to Sheldon.
Susan, when you talk about compliance, I wonder whether your
question looks more to transactional compliance. In what context
are you asking the question?
PROFESSOR CARLE: I think that is a very good point. One of the
problems is that we have the same set of rules that apply to “after the
milk is spilled” representation, representation post wrongdoing. We
apply the same rules to those lawyers as we do to the lawyers who are
supposed to be keeping the milk from coming out of the glass in the
first place.
Maybe what the SEC is saying here is, to the extent that you are
situated as a lawyer to prevent the problem, you need to be a lot more
aggressive than you seem as a matter of your professional culture to
feel you need to be at this point.
MS. HACKETT: I think that it is actually even broader than that. I
mean you have gone from terms of litigation versus litigation and
transactional work. I would take it even further. I think the bulk of
what I see in-house counsel doing these days does not even fall into
either one of those categories. It falls into something that us more
broadly termed “counseling.” It may not be around any specific deal.
It may not be around any specific matter. It may not be in response
to milk that has spilled. It may be the day-to-day workings that have
functional strategic teams working on the development of products,
working on the provision of services, working on the administration
of the corporation’s assets, the personnel and everything else.
Lawyers are involved in an in-house basis as managers in the same
regard, or in the same way, that other corporate managers are
involved. They have a business function to perform. The in-house
counsel, if they are doing their role well in the modern corporation,
does not wait for the client to request advice. That person is in the
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trench every day developing the product and service, and they wear a
business hat almost as often as they wear a legal hat. Another ethical
problem is the issue of when are you doing business versus when are
you acting as a lawyer? One that we have a lot of $1000 seminars on if
you are ever interested in attending. But all that aside—
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: You are into teaching.
MS. HACKETT: It is a pattern here, isn’t it? I think it is important
to note that the role of counseling has dramatically changed, and I
think you have hit it right on the head, Susan, by noting that the
same rules are created to try to regulate all of that behavior. They
were written in the context of assuming a litigation, state court based,
not federally legal mandate. They were written in an era when
lawyers waited until clients came to them to request advice.
I think that we, at least within our organization, have come to the
informal conclusion that one of the things we have to work on is
proposing new Model Rules for the attorney-client privilege. I think
there have been gross abuses of how the attorney-client privilege has
been used inappropriately in recent years, at least in the ways we
believe that lawyers are supposed to function in today’s organizations.
Having said that, I still believe that it is the linchpin or the
foundation of the lawyer-client relationship and should not be
diminished. It is just necessary for us sit down and have a very
informed dialogue, away from the heat of this kind of post-Enron
corporate financial debacle, to talk about what the attorney-client
privilege should be and how it should be used in today’s
environment—decide how it should be regulated in a way that is not
in response in Sarbanes-Oxley.
MR. KRANTZ: Susan, if I could just add one comment. From my
experience, even though I am primarily focused on litigation, we do a
lot of preventive compliance work too that we have brought into
companies to try to steer them through things.
I think the tensions over the last ten years that have created some
of the problems are: one, there is no doubt there has been corporate
greed over a good number of years and the question is how do you
control people who want to make as much money as they can because
this is America? Versus another stress, that is, in effect, we are overregulated in many ways in this country. We have complex regulations
for every aspect of business life, whether it is environmental
regulations, or healthcare regulations, or government contract
regulations, where even very sophisticated counsel and companies
cannot understand what the rules are. Violations of those rules used
to be dealt with as civil matters. They have now become criminal
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matters with virtually strict liability connotations.
It is within that spirit that we begin to address some of these
problems. I think to a certain extent there are companies or people
in companies up to no good. In other situations, there are people
that simply do not understand the rules, and they are trying to get
guidance. I think you really have to think about issues with that in
mind.
MS. HACKETT: Let’s start first with the fact that most lawyers do
not understand the rules of their own profession. We are beyond
talking about regulation. Since this is a law school program, let’s
begin at the law school level.
My members consider themselves to be very ethical people and
people who are very proud of their commitment to professional
responsibility in the way that they represent their clients. I know
from my work that most of them are not intimately familiar with the
Model Rules or the rules in their states or the rules in the many states
in which they are practicing where they are not even admitted.
I think it is an increasing problem that we look at addressing these
kinds of issues through changes of the regulations which lawyers
themselves admit that they do not pay attention to anyway. It seems
almost that, if you want to be sure that there will be no change in the
way that lawyers behave, the best way to do it might be to change the
rules of professional behavior since most lawyers learn what they
know about ethics in a practical manner, not by reading the rules
every day. Most of them do not have a copy of the rules, do not know
where they could find a copy of the rules, and they learn what they
learn at the hands of the people who trained them.
That starts in law school and it goes on through your journeyman
type experiences whether it is in a government position, in a law firm,
or working in a clerkship. Some people get great ethical training,
some people get seat of the pants ethical training, and some people
never think twice about it. But very few of them from any of those
categories have any knowledge of what the rules actually say.
That was pointed to earlier by the person who talked about how
1.13 is not seen as the mode of reporting within most organizations,
because most lawyers who work with organizational clients do not
know what 1.13 says. They are not bad people. They do not consider
themselves unethical.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Could I follow-up on that?
PROFESSOR CARLE: Yes, sure.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: I guess I am interested in listening to
what the two of you just said. At the extent to which decisions like
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Delaware’s Chancellor Allen’s decision in Caremark or the federal
43
sentencing guidelines have set up the kinds of cultures that lean
more toward up the ladder reporting, setting up procedures within a
company for legal compliance systems and reporting. In a sense they
do not blunt section 307, or the SEC’s rules, but they make the SEC’s
rules not the only story that is going on. To what extent does what
the SEC’s doing, apart from the going to the Commission part,
change much?
MR. KRANTZ: First of all, I think that the statement that the SEC’s
rules are not dramatically different than 1.13 makes no sense.
Because if you take a look at the process—
MS. HACKETT: Yes, it is a horrible rule.
MR. KRANTZ: It is very difficult—
MS. HACKETT: Its intentions are good, but it is really a very bad
rule for purposes of guidance.
MR. KRANTZ: It is very difficult to understand. In large public
companies the thought that you would be working your way up the
ladder from president to board; it just would not happen in most
situations. As a practical matter, I do not think that the fight that
goes on is going to focus on how many steps along the way within a
company you have to go.
Let me just give you another illustration about how ridiculous 1.13
is, because most of the companies in America are relatively small
companies. I have a situation now where there is a president of the
company and the sole stockholder. He asked me to do an internal
corporate investigation.
I did the investigation and what I
determined is, he is the problem.
First of all, my view is, I guess I have to report that to him. Then
the question is, do I then discuss the fact that he has to step aside
when he is the sole owner of the company or I am going to somehow
42. See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (approving a proposed
settlement agreement in a suit involving claims that Caremark’s Board of Directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care). Chancellor Allen approved the proposed
settlement agreement after stating that the claims asserted against the Caremark
Board at this point were very weak, and that there was a low probability that the
board breached any duty. Id. at 961. The settlement required Caremark to establish
a “Compliance and Ethics Committee” consisting of four directors, two of whom had
to be non-management, to meet a minimum of four times a year and report to the
board annually. Id. at 966.
43. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, 2C1.8, 2E5.3,
2J1.2, 2T4.1, 3D1.2, 5E1.2 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (amending the sentencing guidelines
under emergency amendment authority granted by Congress and implementing
provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Campaign Finance Reform Act
through establishment of penalty levels and individual fines for various white collar
crimes, violations of permissive election practices, etc.).
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turn him in?
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: This is the Lord Chancellor and—
MR. KRANTZ: There are variations of that where you are dealing
with very small companies, or family operated companies, in effect,
where cousins have to decide what to do with somebody who is
related to them and is also the president. And 1.13 just—again the
44
SEC rules would not deal with that.
MS. HACKETT: The SEC rules would not cover that because it is
45
not a public company.
MR. KRANTZ: It is not a public company, right.
PROFESSOR CARLE: We have a question out here in the
audience.
SPEAKER: I just want to help the Commission here. We are going
to be writing comment letters, and I am trying to pinpoint where the
concerns are about these rules. There are three areas. One, the
mandatory report to the board if senior management won’t do
anything about that. What I am hearing is that most of the lawyers
are going to want to do that anyway, and I have not heard any
credible argument as to why the board of directors of a client should
not be told that senior management won’t rectify a violation.
MS. HACKETT: They should be told that. There is no question.
SPEAKER: Okay.
That is the first part. Second part is the

44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (listing a lawyer’s
responsibilities when the client is an organization). Rule 1.13 contemplates a
situation in which the lawyer represents an organization with a multi-tiered
management system, rather than a small or family run company. For example, if a
lawyer discovers a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, Rule 1.13(b)
provides measures the lawyer might take, such as:
(1)asking for reconsideration of the matter;
(2)advising that a separate opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3)referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
Id. R. 1.13(b).
45. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Website, The Laws that Govern
the Securities Industry (stating that public companies must register with the SEC under
the Securities Act of 1933 in order to offer securities to the public, and that
companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more
than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic reports under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Aug.
8, 2000). When an attorney represents a public company that must either register or
report under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley will provide the minimum standards of professional
conduct for those attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC. See Frederick
K. Koenen, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC: New Dilemmas for Attorneys, 17 No. 3 WHITECOLLAR CRIME REP. 17, 17 (2002).
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46

mandatory noisy withdrawal.
It seems that is what most lawyers
would want to do, anyway, to get the heck out of there and disaffirm
any documents they had given to the Commission that had their
name on it and that just simply now they know are not true. Is that a
concern?
And/or the third part, which is where the SEC just says the lawyer
may—does not have to—disclose outside the client organization to
the Commission, which is what as you correctly point out, forty-one
47
states permit. I think two, New Jersey and Florida, actually require it
if there is a client crime—to present information necessary to prevent
48
a client crime. A very few go along with the ABA rule which is only
if there is death, grievous bodily injury at stake, and/or the lawyer’s
49
fee isn’t paid under Model Rule 1.6.
46. See Implementation of the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71706 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205) (requiring an attorney who has reported evidence of a material violation to the
issuer, and has not received an appropriate response, to:
withdraw from
representing the issuer; give written notice to the Commission of the withdraw; and
promptly disaffirm any document that the attorney has prepared and filed with the
Commission that may be materially false or misleading).
47. See Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality, and the Organizational Client,
58 BUS. LAW. 123, 128 (stating that forty-one states permit or require disclosure
outside the client organization to prevent a client from committing a fraud that
constitutes a crime, while eleven also permit or require disclosure of non-criminal
fraud if it is “likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another”).
48. See Jolyn M. Pope, Transactional Attorneys—The Forgotten Actors in Rule 1.6
Disclosure Dramas: Financial Crime and Fraud Mandate Permissive Disclosure of Confidential
Information, 69 TENN. L. REV. 145, 173 (2001) (discussing various states’ approaches to
the lawyer’s disclosure of client’s confidential information). The professional
responsibility codes in Florida, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin all provide that
an attorney must disclose criminal fraud. Id. Only Virginia and Wisconsin’s codes
provide that an attorney must disclose non-criminal fraud. Id.
49. See id. at 158 n.88, 173 (citing the states that track the ABA rule as Alabama,
Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South
Dakota). Additionally, the District of Columbia follows the ABA rule. Id.; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (listing situations under which a lawyer may
disclose client’s confidential information). Rule 1.6(b) reads:
(b) a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceedings concerning the
lawyer’s representation of the client.
The 2002 version of Rule 1.6(b), adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, but not
currently adopted by any state reads:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
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PROFESSOR BAUMAN: That will also lead to death and bodily
harm.
MS. HACKETT: Handling those two together, the issue that they
may report outside of the corporation and the issue of the
disaffirmation of any information reported to the SEC. I understand
what you are talking about, but both of those situations involve what I
would say is a violation of the attorney-client privilege.
It is impossible for a lawyer to go to the SEC and say to them, “I am
not divulging anything that is attorney-client privileged or in any way
violating the trust of my client by telling you that I disaffirm
everything that has appeared in this company’s 10K for the last five
years.”
Are those secret code words that if I say I am withdrawing from
representation for professional reasons or I am disaffirming
information filed that we do not all know what that means? It means
that the SEC should trigger an investigation. They should launch an
investigation.
SPEAKER: Okay. But you have not lost the privilege. I do not
think there is a court in the land that—
MS. HACKETT: Well, practically, I think you have lost the
privilege because there is not a single organization out there that is
not going to say that the lawyer has violated the trust of management
by reporting that there is illegal activity going on at this company.
SPEAKER: The privilege is different. It is that a court would
actually say, “Now that all the documents that the lawyer has that are
communications between the lawyer and the client are now
50
discoverable.” I do not think that noisy withdrawal sacrifices the
privilege at all under the rules of evidence. Correct me, if I am
wrong.

(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance Rules;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
representation of the client; or
(4) to comply with other law or a court order.
50. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
§ 1.3.1, at 25-26 (Aspen Law & Business 2002) (explaining that while Rule 1.6
governs a lawyer’s ethical duty to keep the client’s confidences, this does not govern
the judicial application of the attorney-client privilege where a judge may issue a
subpoena against a lawyer to reveal certain client information).
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PROFESSOR CARLE: As an ethics professor, I just want to
51
introduce the distinction between the evidentiary privilege and the
52
ethical mandate of confidentiality. So we could just switch and talk
about that, the ethical issue of keeping a client’s information
confidential.
SPEAKER: Yes, see I do not think that you have lost the privilege
when you do the noisy withdrawal. The ABA under its own Model
53
Rules even allowed, under a comment to 1.6, the noisy withdrawal.
It says that it is not an ethical violation. Even the ABA said that it is
permissible.
You do lose the privilege when you go to the SEC and do what they
say you may do which is to describe what happened. Now you have
lost the privilege. I think the SEC is wrong to say you have not when
you go. That is the third part of that which is the optional disclosure.
MR. KRANTZ: I can understand the distinction that you are
making. But you are still talking about a situation where a lawyer is
becoming an instrument to be used against a client.
It is a fundamentally important question. Maybe you are right.
Maybe it goes a little bit beyond attorney-client privilege. But we have
seen a number of situations of that in other contexts, and I frankly
am very uncomfortable with the idea of a lawyer becoming an
instrument that can be used against a client.
SPEAKER: But you have not lost the privilege.
MR. KRANTZ: I agree that, to frame it this way, you have not lost
the privilege.
SPEAKER: That is the noisy withdrawal. The third step you have.
PROFESSOR CARLE: I think there is a question over here.
SPEAKER: I want go back to something that Professor Bauman said
earlier, we have all been focusing on legal departments, and lawyers,
and general counsel. There is a lot else going on outside that box.
In a previous life, I did environmental law that was in-house for a
corporation, and my greatest ally was the risk management
department and our insurance carrier. I am curious to know what
51. See id. at 25-26 (emphasizing that the evidentiary privilege only arises during a
judicial proceeding when a litigant attempts to compel the disclosure of information
allegedly protected by this privilege).
52. See id. at 25 (describing the ethical privilege as applying to a broader range of
information than the evidentiary privilege). Ethical duties prohibit disclosure of a
client’s information not only in-court, but also out-of-court. For example, if a lawyer
discusses a client’s confidential information during a casual conversation, this will
breach the ethical duty but not the evidentiary duty. Id. at 26.
53. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (indicating that this rule does
not prevent a lawyer from giving notice of withdrawal, and does not prohibit
withdrawing or disaffirming any of the lawyer’s work product).
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Ms. Hackett’s response is to this, which is, what do your clients or
members say is happening to their O & D insurance premiums? I bet
you they are going up right now. Has the insurance carrier started to
look at certain behavior as being more risky today than it was viewed
as being a year ago? That’s a major check. That’s a liability that
boards and management understand.
MS. HACKETT: I think that what we have seen is that certainly
rates will be going up. I cannot say that we have done a lot of
surveying on this or have a lot of very technical information. What I
think the greater concern is, however, is that it is going to be harder
and harder to attract the right people to be directors of
organizations.
There already are a dearth of really highly qualified, extremely
participatory, and well-informed directors who are available out
there. Those people who do perform the role of independent
directors or directors who take part in corporate activity in a
meaningful way. There are going to be fewer and fewer of them who
are willing to work with a larger number of organizations. They will
probably limit the number of organizations that they work with so
they can do that much more diligence, if you will, in working with
those organizations they stay with.
I suppose at some level that is good. I have never been overly fond
of the model of the director who works with forty-seven different
corporations because it is virtually impossible for them to really, truly
be a director at any one of them. Having said that, a lot of people
who do not need to do this, because they are either personally
wealthy or they have come to a point in their careers when they do
not need to take the hassle of these kinds of requirements that have
now come out, will simply step away from being directors at all.
I think that is a shame because very often the best directors are the
people who have been out in public life for quite a few years, have
had a broad number of experiences at different organizations, and
they are simply going to say, “Hey, look, I can’t spend the time
necessary to certify what I need to certify now for every one of the
organizations I’d work with, so I’m stepping back.”
I think that there will be insurer carrier issues. But I think that
most people who I am talking to are most concerned about attracting
the right talent nowadays, because people just won’t want to accept
the potential for liability that they could have working with
organizations where they can not be aware of the day-to-day workings
of these megalithic cultures.
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PROFESSOR CARLE: While we are on that topic, there is one
thing that struck me that I thought lawyers might like, either lawyers
who counsel other lawyers in malpractice cases, ACCA, or criminal
defense lawyers, which are the provisions that provide that a lawyer
who does not want to report outside the organization can use the
other route of referring the matter to the Qualified Legal
54
Compliance Committee (“QLCC”) , which is supposed to have two
independent directors on it.
Isn’t that a solution to all of these problems with 1.13? You pass
the buck to somebody else—to somebody who is being paid to
monitor, paid to direct the organization. This is an easy bright-line, a
safe harbor.
MS. HACKETT: It is a perfect way to provide cover for lawyers.
PROFESSOR CARLE: Why aren’t you happy about that?
MS. HACKETT: That assumes that clients are going to be all that
interested in establishing one. Why is it that, practically, if I am the
CEO of a company and my general counsel comes to me and says, we
should, as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, institute this QLCC because it is
the perfect way to insure that I will have no liability for any problems
that might arise? Indeed, we’ll put that liability instead on a couple
of our directors. They will be the ones who will report to you, and
then you will be the ones making the decisions together about
whether you are going to trigger an SEC discussion.
MR. KRANTZ: Then look at their insurance premium.
MS. HACKETT: Exactly.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: But they would present the proposition a
little differently.
MS. HACKETT: Of course they would. But I am just trying to
create for you what I think is the practical problem with it. It is a
brilliant solution to the lawyer liability and the lawyer professional
responsibility issues. I think from an earlier conversation someone
said it was the idea of Harvey Pitt to add this in there. I think it could
offer some companies great relief for the legal function.
But you have got to come back to the client. Why is the client all
that interested in establishing yet another audit committee type
function in an era where they are struggling to understand how to
54. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71670, 71704 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205.2) (providing that a qualified legal compliance committee must “consist[] of at
least one member of the issuer’s audit committee and two or more members of the
issuer’s board of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer
and who are not, in the case of a registered investment company, ‘interested
persons’”).
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deal with and how to properly work with the audit committees they
are or aren’t working with well already? I just do not see that there
are going to be an awful lot of clients who are going to rush to
embrace this.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Isn’t it possible that it will be like so
much else in state corporate law, where a court says, “You know, you
should have an independent negotiating committee.”
MS. HACKETT: Absolutely.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: A special litigation committee, and all of
sudden, there it is? The court has said it—it sets up an umbrella.
Although nobody says that there will be no liability if you do that,
everybody understands it as such. That is the impetus, because the
SEC as an agency is giving its blessing to it and that is why you do it.
MS. HACKETT: Presumably it is too late to set one up after you
have already started “up the ladder,” and decided you do not want to
be responsible for what happens when you get to the top rung.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Sure.
MS. HACKETT: By definition, if a court is doing it, it means that
someone has already fallen afoul of this.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: The SEC has now set out the road map.
MS. HACKETT: Okay.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Just as the first case affirmed the validity
of the special litigation committee—it was too late to set up the
committee once you’d been sued, except in some cases but generally
speaking. Thereon you knew you’d set up that kind of a committee.
The SEC is now saying, set up a QLCC.
MS. HACKETT: I think that the SEC is not saying set up a QLCC,
though. I think the SEC is saying, if you wish to avoid attorney-client
privilege problems, you can go this other route. At least I do not read
the rules or what is coming out here as saying—it is saying this is an
option. They are not saying this is the best practice.
It may be that, in a couple of years, it will clearly be the best
practice. For the shorter term at least, even though it is a very bright
solution to the problem for lawyers, it is a lawyer created solution for
a lawyer problem as opposed to a corporate issue that companies
seem to think they should be addressing.
I am a little bit worried that, although I think it may be very bright,
I do not think a lot of people are going to rush to adopt them yet.
They may over time.
MR. BURGER: If I was a corporate officer and the president of a
company asked me, “Art, how would you like to be a member of the
QLCC—in fact, we’ll let you chair it.” I think I would say, “I will
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volunteer for any other committee and I will blow up every balloon
for the annual New Year’s Party, but I think I have brain surgery
scheduled for that day that you’re setting up the . . . .”
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: Art, your choice is you choose between
the audit committee or the QLCC. You can be the chair of one.
What’s your pleasure?
MR. BURGER: I quit.
PROFESSOR CARLE: We have a question from the audience.
SPEAKER: There was a suggestion earlier that perhaps the QLCC
in essence would be the audit committee in many instances. It fits
within the statutory definition, for instance. It is already something
that exists. What is your sense of how that may play out?
MS. HACKETT: I have to spend more time getting cozy with the
pages that were issued last night, but my understanding is that the
QLCC that is in this regulation is defined as a three-member
organization. While you could say that you were going to create an
audit committee that had three members who happened to be the
same three members of the QLCC, I just do not think a lot of
companies are going to rush to make their audit committee fit this
role.
The audit committee right now is by everybody’s standards, in the
media as well as within the corporate world, the focal point of all
activity right now. You want to get the audit committee right. So, the
idea of creating a three-person group because that is what is
mandated here, so it could also serve a double duty as being QLCC,
just does not seem terribly likely to me.
But I really have not reviewed this in depth enough to know
whether it could be composed differently. I do not know enough
about audit committee or corporate governance issues to tell you
whether there are any problems with a three-person audit committee.
I would presume that, if I was having an audit committee within a
board, I would probably want the audit committee a little bit larger.
Not a lot larger but a little bit larger than three members. I think
that is a pretty small group.
I have a feeling the QLCC will be a topic of much discussion in the
comments that go into the SEC over the course of the next thirty
days. It is a new concept out there.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: It ought to be scary to pick up on what
Judge Sporkin said at lunch to those of you who are students here. It
ought to be scary to you how many of us already have the ninety-three
pages that came out on the Web last night. Scariest of all is that Art
has underlined it; he’s got yellow markings all over the place. That
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ought to be a really scary object lesson.
PROFESSOR CARLE: I have a lot of other questions I would love
to ask the panel, but I am wondering if there are any from the
students? I think the comments are well taken. This is something
that is going to affect your practice lives.
I am interested in the distinction that is drawn between in-house
counsel and outside counsel and the idea that in-house counsel’s
outside reporting obligations are less strict. My understanding of the
U.S. system of professional regulation is that the decision was made
not to draw these distinctions, to recognize the same standards of
professional responsibility and not create sort of a second class
category of lawyers who do not really have professional
independence. So I would imagine that there is some ambivalence
about that. I am just wondering, what’s your position on it?
MS. HACKETT: As an organization we were founded on the
principle that there were too many places within the profession, both
codified and uncodified, where there was disparate treatment
between the inside bar and outside bar. So, clearly it is something
that I am paying very close attention to.
I think there are an awful lot of people within the in-house
community who would like to have some kind of buffer written that
will provide them some level of job security. I am not speaking on
their behalf when I tell you that the position of the ACCA has always
been that in-house counsel do not have any different professional
obligations and that one of the responsibilities of going in-house—
there are a lot of attendant perks to being an in-house counsel.
There are different kinds of work environments and different kinds
of challenges, and different types of career enhancements that are
available to you.
One of the difficulties is that if you fall out with your client, it is not
just one client off the roster of the firm. Your livelihood has now
ended, and potentially it can be a career ending issue, not just a
question of going out and getting another one. You may be damaged
goods now in the in-house market.
We firmly believe as an organization that there are certainly
legitimate concerns for people who are employed by their clients
about job security and what their rights as employees may be in
contradiction to their responsibilities as attorneys. You are right not
to be able to exercise whistle-blower kinds of provisions without
having some kind of repercussion.
Ultimately, at the end of the day the Association’s stance has always
been that the client has the ultimate right to choose the counsel of
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their choice. If the client does not wish to retain you as counsel, it
does not matter whether you get your paycheck on a retainer or
whether you get your paycheck on a corporate stub, you’re out. You
should have no ability to force that client to continue to work with
you.
I think that, while the rules may have offered a different track, the
practical implication outside of the reporting is that both lawyers are
going to end up without work from that client in the future. It is
inconceivable to me that a lawyer who chooses to report to the SEC is
going to be a welcome colleague on the team in the future, even if
that person had an obligation to do so. That is unfortunate, but
that’s just reality. Even if they are not fired outright, they will
probably be constructively unemployed by that corporation pretty
soon.
MR. BURGER: I think that is just a practical reality and was one of
my concerns about the statute as it was written. But I think that in
the rules giving the lawyer the right to report the fact that they think
55
that they were fired for complying with this law —and here is one
express reference to attorney-client privilege. It says it is not a
violation of attorney-client privilege for this discharged lawyer to
56
report that fact to the Commission. It gives the lawyer an awful lot
of power in that relationship although that’s a heck of a way to hold
on to a client.
MS. HACKETT: I do not know anyone who would want to
continue to work in that environment. Your resume is on the street
as soon as this happens no matter whether you are inside or you are
outside on this.
PROFESSOR CARLE: Do you have a question over there?
SPEAKER: Is Sarbanes-Oxley really a regulatory vehicle for
correcting what is a lack of concern for the public interest in our
existing professional responsibility principles?
MR. BURGER: Yes.
MS. HACKETT: Yes.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: A strong letter follows.
MR. BURGER: Let me just say that I think that it is possible to
overstate the differences that are being made. As everybody here
55. See id. at 71706 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)) (stating that an
attorney who “has reported evidence of a material violation under this section and
reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged for so doing may notify the
Commission that he or she believes that he or she has been discharged for reporting
evidence of a material violation under this section.”).
56. See id. (indicating that “[t]he notification to the Commission prescribed by
this paragraph (d) does not breach the attorney-cleint privilege.”).
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knows, as long as there has been an attorney-client privilege, there
57
has been an exception for crime fraud. Plus, this does not go much
further than Rule 1.13, which I think is a good rule.
In terms of the federalization of the rules, it will be interesting to
see if that goes any further. Now, these rules are limited to just what
they say and they go out of their way to say that state bar rules still
apply on everything else that might govern an SEC practice,
58
including advertising and the whole panoply.
59
But I think, under the Supremacy Clause, it is pretty clear that if
there were to be an inconsistency between what the rules of
professional conduct of a particular state require and what a federal
60
regulation would require, I think the federal rule would govern.
SPEAKER: If you are dealing with different jurisdictions, aren’t
you obligated to follow the stricter jurisdiction? I mean, like
advertising. West Virginia has various regulations on advertising.
MR. BURGER: Advertising is one area in which you clearly are
going to—the phrase is “jumping the higher hurdle.” When you
advertise, in effect you are engaging in conduct wherever the
61
advertisement can be read, so the choice of law is that you better
run scared and comply. But, no, I think the choice of law answer for
an SEC lawyer, wherever they are licensed is that their conduct would

57. See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 445 (1986) (tracing
the history of the crime-fraud exception, and indicating that it is traceable to at least
1743).
58. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71673 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (commenting that the SEC
does not “intend to supplant state ethics laws unnecessarily, particularly in areas (e.g.
safeguarding of client assets, escrow procedures, advertising) where the Commission
lacks expertise.”).
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
60. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71703 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.1) (stating “[w]here the
standards of a state where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part,
this part shall govern.”). See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 59, 151-60 (2002) (analyzing whether the Supremacy Clause would give
Congress the power to establish a uniform system of attorney-client privilege).
61. See GREGORY H. SISKIND ET AL., THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE
INTERNET 161 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing internet advertising, indicating that it is
important for lawyers to understand all state rules that will supply to their website
advertisements as there is no current consensus on jurisdiction); see also LOUISE H.
HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 137 (1993) (highlighting the issue of potential
unauthorized practice of law when a lawyer advertises nationally or advertisements
reach into jurisdictions other than the one in which a lawyer practices, and
indicating that there is currently no consensus on jurisdictional issues).
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have to be in compliance with SEC regulations. If there were an
irreconcilable conflict, then I think I would have to go with the SEC
rules.
SPEAKER: But my point is, let’s take the rule for D.C. I am
advertising in D.C. I can get sanctioned by West Virginia, but then
the D.C. Bar comes after me for reciprocity there—
MR. BURGER: Right. For advertising, you are right. For anything
else, I think you are not right, because there is no way in other
contexts to say necessarily which is more strict. If D.C. says that you
can not violate a client confidence, and the SEC says, “oh, yes, you
can,” then they are different. I do not know how you would say which
one is more strict, but I think you would need to comply with the
federal. Do you agree, Susan?
PROFESSSOR CARLE: Yes.
MR. BURGER: Yes.
PROFESSOR CARLE: We just have a couple of minutes left. Is
there anybody who has not had a chance to ask a question who wants
to comment or ask a question?
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: I wanted to respond to the questioner
over there.
PROFESSOR CARLE: Okay.
PROFESSOR BAUMAN: To refer you to a very interesting article
that Richard Painter wrote on the moral interdependence of
corporate lawyers, that essentially Sarbanes-Oxley is only one part of a
much more complex—the practice of corporate and securities law is
63
a complex business.
Sarbanes-Oxley, in the sense that it comes out of Enron, focuses on
a very, very, very narrow slice. The broader issues of the role of the
lawyer, gatekeeper, whatever it is, raise quite seriously issues where
there are legitimate differences of opinion as to what the appropriate
role of the lawyer is in the corporate setting.
SPEAKER (PROFESSOR PAINTER): The purpose of the optional
disclosure to the SEC I think is precisely this. That there are a
minority of jurisdictions, say about eight or nine, that have adhered
to the view that the lawyer may not disclosure the client confidences,
64
even to prevent a financial fraud.
The ABA’s own Ethics 2000
62. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. at 71670 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
63. See Richard W. Painter, Congress Tells Corporate Lawyers to Tell Directors About
Fraud, 6 No. 3 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM 6 (2002) (emphasizing that it is the duty of
the SEC to tell corporate lawyers what their responsibilities entail when they discover
their corporate clients commit fraud).
64. See Pope, supra note 48, at 158 n.88, 173 (indicating that Alabama, California,
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Commission recommended that that be changed in 1.6.
66
Over forty jurisdictions say, in effect, what the SEC is saying. If
you are a securities lawyer representing a publicly traded company,
then you ought to play by the rule that over forty states have adopted,
which is that you may disclose. You do not have to, but you may, and
California shouldn’t be able to hassle you for this or D.C.
I think you are exactly right, that this is a trumping of those few
jurisdictions.
MS. HACKETT: Let’s just remember that—we were talking about
this earlier, one on one. Permissive disclosure has its warts as well. In
making a decision as the lawyer as to whether or not you wish to
report you are going to run into some difficulties as well if you do not
report and hindsight is always twenty-twenty. If it looks like you
should have, you will now be, I believe, held to a higher standard of
persecution than you would have otherwise.
I think the other thing that is key to remember here is that if you
choose to report and you did not have to, how is it that your
relationship with your client can ever be reconciled? You have now
chosen to report them when you didn’t have to report them. So, you
have violated the fundamental trust between them whether you like
that result or not, and that is a practical reality for the people who
you’re representing.
I am not an advocate of mandatory disclosure by any stretch of the
imagination. But I think we have to be careful about jumping onto
the boat of saying, “Oh, well, permissive disclosure is the answer as

Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
the District of Columbia do not permit a lawyer to disclose client confidences to
prevent financial fraud).
65. The Ethics 2000 Commission’s Report recommended amending Rule 1.6 to
include the following subsections to (b) of the confidentiality rule:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to
result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s
services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these
Rules;
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report_home.html. The ABA House of
Delegates rejected (b)(2), and the Ethics 2000 Commission withdrew (b)(3)
form consideration. The delegates accepted (b)(4) and (b)(6). Id.
66. See sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the result,” because I think it does have warts as well.
MR. BURGER: I think there is an argument to be made that if you
are going to have disclosure, make it mandatory, so the lawyer knows,
I am supposed to do this, or I am supposed to do that. At least you
would have clarity.
PROFESSOR CARLE: I see our time is up. If we could just thank
our panelists, and then I think the Editor-in-Chief has something to
say.
MS. CHLOPAK: If you could just give me about one more minute
of your time. I would like once again to thank all of the people who
have helped make today possible. In particular, I’d like to thank all
of the panelists, Dean Pike, Professors Guttman, Wallace, Quinn, and
Carle, and the editors and staff of the Law Review, especially Julie
Wilson and Lisa Wetzel Ross, whose extraordinary efforts helped
make this event a success.

